![]() ![]() It is true that, in their foundation of the principle of non-contradiction, Bonetus and Baconthorpe effect a dissociation of the subject of first philosophy and the first object of the intellect, which seems to challenge the very legitimizing strategy of the medieval transformation of metaphysics. The present article argues that, on the one hand, innovative attempts to found the principle of non-contradiction of the Franciscan Nicolaus Bonetus and the Carmelite John Baconthorpe demonstrate the stability of this epistemic constellation. the principle of non-contradiction, in the first known, transcendental concepts of the mind. In this epistemic constellation, a new thought presents itself: the foundation of Aristotle’s unconditional starting point of thinking, i.e. (1952), Medieval Logic, Manchester University Press.The epistemic constellation that underlies the transformation of metaphysics in the 13th and 14th century is legitimized by the identification of the subject of first philosophy with the first object of the intellect. A translation of Summa Logicae III-II : De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, with selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio. Longeway, John Lee (2007), Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.Freddoso, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 1980. Freddoso and Henry Schuurman and introduced by Alfred J. Ockham's Theory of Propositions : Part II of the Summa Logicae, translated by Alfred J.Loux, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 1974. Ockham's Theory of Terms : Part I of the Summa Logicae, translated and introduced by Michael J.Ockham ends (chapter 18) by showing how all these fallacies err against the syllogism.Chapter 17 deals with the fallacy of many questions ( plures interrogationes ut unam facere)>.Chapter 16 deals with false cause ( non-causam ut causam).Chapter 15 deals with begging the question ( petitio principii).Chapter 14 deals with Ignoratio elenchi or irrelevant thesis.Chapter 13 deals with converse accident or secundum quid et simpliciter. ![]() Chapter 12 deals with the fallacy of affirming the consequent.Chapter 11 deals with the fallacy of accident.Chapter 10 deals with the fallacy of 'figure of speech'.Chapter 9 deals with the 'Fallacy of accent'.Chapter 8 deals with the fallacies of composition, and division.Chapters 5-7 deal with the three types of amphiboly.Chapters 2-4 deal with the three modes of equivocation.Part IV, in eighteen chapters, deals with the different species of fallacy enumerated by Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations ( De sophisticis elenchis). Chapters 38 to 45 deal with the theory of obligationes.Similar accounts are given by Jean Buridan and Albert of Saxony. Ockham distinguishes between 'material' and 'formal' consequences, which are roughly equivalent to the modern material implication and logical implication respectively. A consequence is 'true' when the antecedent implies the consequent. For example 'if a man runs, then God exists' ( Si homo currit, Deus est). According to Ockham a consequence is a conditional proposition, composed of two categorical propositions by the terms 'if' and 'then'. ![]() In Part III, Ockham deals with the definition and division of consequences, and provides a treatment of Aristotle's Topical rules. The first 37 chapters of Part II are a systematic exposition of Aristotle's Topics. ![]()
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